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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the relationship between soybean oil and biodiesel markets in the US 
through a structural model and a time-series econometric model. A conceptual link is built based 
on the theories of market efficiencies and implications of a binding mandate on supply and 
demand. We hypothesize that a long run zero-profit relationship governs the biodiesel and 
soybean oil pricing relationships. We test for this using a structural model based on an Iowa 
biodiesel plant. We additionally use formal time series testing including Johansen Trace test and 
a vector error correction model and the Kejriwal and Perron test. We find that under certain 
policy conditions our hypothesis holds but not throughout the sample studied.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my Father and Mother   
  iv 
Table of Contents 
 
LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………………………...…...…vi 
LIST OF FIGURES…………………………………………………………………………...…vii 
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Background ........................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Objectives .............................................................................................................................. 2 
1.3 Data and Methodology……………………………………………………..……………… 2 
1.4 Overview ............................................................................................................................... 3 
2. THE BIODIESEL INDUSTRY............................................................................................... 4 
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 4 
2.2 Biodiesel Production Process ................................................................................................ 4 
2.3 Overview of the US Biodiesel Industry ................................................................................ 6 
2.4 Policies and Government Incentives……………………………………………………….. 8 
2.5 US Biodiesel Supply and Use. ............................................................................................ 12 
2.6 Summary…..…………………….…………………………………………………….…..14 
3.  LITERATURE REVIEW……………………………………………………………….....…16 
3.1 Introduction…………….……………………………………………………………….…16 
3.2 Economic Feasibility and Profitability Studies ................................................................... 16 
3.3 Commodity and Energy Markets Linkage studies………………..……………………….19 
3.4 Summary ............................................................................................................................. 24 
4. THEORY, DATA AND METHODOLOGY ........................................................................ 26 
4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 26 
4.2 Theory ................................................................................................................................. 26 
    4.2.1 The Biodiesel Market and the Theory of Perfectly Competitive Markets…..........…..26 
       4.2.2 The Implications of Government Incentive on Biodiesel Prices …..……………..…..27 
4.3 Data Description .................................................................................................................. 30 
4.4 The Structural Model .......................................................................................................... 32 
4.5 Time Series Models ............................................................................................................. 34 
4.5.1 Testing for Cointegration  ............................................................................................. 34 
4.5.2 Testing for Structural Breaks ........................................................................................ 37 
  v 
4.6 Summary ............................................................................................................................. 38 
5.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION .............................................................................................. 40 
5.1 Introduction………………..……………………………………………………………... 40 
5.2 Structural Model Results ..................................................................................................... 40 
5.3 Formal Testing Model ......................................................................................................... 44 
5.4 Discussion ........................................................................................................................... 47 
5.5 Summary ............................................................................................................................. 50 
6. CONCLUSIONS....................................................................................................................... 52 
6.1 Summary and Review ......................................................................................................... 52 
6.2 Limitations and Future Work .............................................................................................. 54 
TABLES………….. ................................................................................................................................ 56 
FIGURES .................................................................................................................................................. 61 
REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................................... 85 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  vi 
 
 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics for All the Variables………...……………………………….…....56 
Table 2: Correlation Coefficients among the Variables…………..……………………….….....57 
Table 3: Johansen Cointegration Test for Biodiesel and Soybean oil…………………………...58 
Table 4: Error Correction Results and Granger Causality………………………………….……59 
Table 5: Kejriwal and Perron (2010) Test of Multiple Structural Breaks……………………….60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  vii 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Process Diagram of Soybean Crush and Biodiesel Conversion…………………...…..61 
Figure 2: Feedstock Used for Biodiesel Production in Percentages, 2010 -2012……………..…62 
Figure 3: US Biodiesel Plants by Capacity in Mil of Gallons End of 2012…………..................63 
Figure 4: Biodiesel Plant Size Distribution in the United States by the End of 2012…...……....64 
Figure 5: Percentage Plant Distribution by Feedstock Type 
 Technology in the US, May 2013………………………………………………………..……...65 
Figure 6: US Biodiesel Policies Timeline from 2001-2012 ………………………………..…....66 
Figure 7: Renewable Fuel Standard Proposed Volumes by Year ………….……………………67 
Figure 8: Mandate Biodiesel Volume in Bil of Gallons…...…………………………..…….…..68 
Figure 9: B100 US Consumption and Production in Mil Gallons, 2001 -2011…….………..…..69 
Figure 10: B100 US Exports and Imports in Mil Gallons, 2001-2011………………...……..….70 
Figure 11: The Biodiesel Market in Equilibrium ……………………………...……..…….……71 
Figure 12: The Biodiesel Market under the Impact of a Tax Credit ………………..……...........72 
Figure 13: The Biodiesel Market with a Non-binding Mandate …………………………...……73 
Figure 14: The Biodiesel Market with a Binding Mandate…..………………………………….74 
Figure 15: The Biodiesel Market under the Impact of a Binding 
 Mandate and a Tax Credit……………………………………………..……………...…...…….75 
Figure 16: Biodiesel Pricing under a Binding Mandate ………………..………………………..76 
Figure 17: Biodiesel Pricing with a Large Enough Rightward  
Shift in Supply that Unbinds the Mandate ………………………………...…………………….77 
Figure 18: The Biodiesel Market under the Impact of a Binding Mandate and  
a Tax Credit that is Large Enough to Unbind the Mandate……………………………….…......78 
Figure 19: Weekly Spot Biodiesel and Breakeven Value Over all Costs at Iowa Biodiesel Plant, 
April 13, 2007- March 1, 2013……………………………………...………………………..….79 
Figure 20: Iowa Biodiesel Price and Estimated Breakeven Price Errors, April 13, 2007 - March 
1, 2013………………………………………………………………………………………........80 
Figure 21: Iowa Biodiesel Price and Estimated Breakeven Price Errors with Approximated 
Structural Breaks, April 13, 2007 - March 1, 2013……………………………………………...81 
Figure 22: Chicago Biodiesel and Diesel Spot Prices, April 13, 2007 - March 1, 
2013..…………………………………………………………………………………………..…82 
  viii 
Figure 23: Biodiesel Blenders Gross Margins, April 13, 2007-March 1, 2013………………….83 
Figure 24: Iowa Biodiesel Price and Estimated Breakeven Price Errors with Difference 
 Soybean Oil Conversion Rates, April 13, 2007 - March 1, 2013…….…………………………84 
 
 
 
 1 
1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Background 
Concerns regarding fluctuation in oil prices, environmental issues, rural development and 
national security have led policy makers in the US to pay special attention to biofuels. 
Agricultural commodities are the most widely used feedstock for biofuels. Thus, the growing 
demand for biofuels increased research interest in the price dynamics between energy and 
commodity markets. The integration of these two markets has been widely investigated. Of 
particular interest was whether the increased demand of agricultural products for biofuel use 
contributed to rising food prices. The potential competition for agricultural commodities between 
fuel and food generated a major controversy.  
  In the US, ethanol has been the biofuel of choice, overcrowding other forms of 
bioenergy. Only recently, other biofuels such as biodiesel and sugar-ethanol started receiving 
more attention. The production and consumption of biodiesel rose significantly over the past 
decade. A number of policies were designed to support the biodiesel market and are responsible 
for driving domestic production. In addition to introducing a specific blending requirement and 
assigning biodiesel a higher Renewable Identification Number (RIN) value, the Second 
Renewable Fuel Standard has given biodiesel particular advantage to be eligible to fulfill the 
volumetric requirements of other biofuels. The biodiesel industry is expected to further expand in 
the future, and thus its pricing dynamics are commanding increased academic attention. 
Although, biodiesel can be made from a number of feedstocks, soybean oil is the main feedstock 
for biodiesel in the US. As US biodiesel comes into the spotlight, questions about its price 
dynamics and its impact on soybean oil prices arise.  
 2 
  
1.2 Objectives 
The objective of this thesis is to analyze the pricing linkages between the biodiesel and 
the soybean oil markets in the US. The biodiesel industry in the US has a number of unique 
characteristics as a biofuel in terms of capacity, scale and government intervention.. No research 
has investigated US biodiesel in this manner to our knowledge. We use an approach similar to 
that used in Mallory, Irwin and Hayes (2012). That is, we use economic theories of the market 
efficiency to develop a conceptual link between soybean oil and biodiesel markets and provide 
formal evidence of the link. We use the profit function of a biodiesel plant to test for the 
existence of a zero-profit long-run equilibrium relationship. We estimate a breakeven biodiesel 
price and check for the divergence between the estimate and the true market price. We then 
crosscheck our results using a time series econometric model that is agnostic to our theoretical 
intuition.  
1.3 Data and Methodology  
The dataset consists of weekly spot prices for Iowa soybean oil, Iowa biodiesel, Iowa 
natural gas, and national glycerin and methanol from the week ending in April 13, 2007 until the 
week ending in March 1, 2013. Additional data includes weekly Chicago biodiesel spot prices 
and nearby heating oil prices for the same period and Ultra Low Sulfur Diesel spot prices from 
September 4, 2009 until March 1, 2012.  Crude Iowa soybean oil prices were obtained from the 
Iowa Soybean Processor Report from the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service. Iowa biodiesel 
prices were collected from the National Weekly Ag Energy Roundup from the USDA 
Agricultural Statistics Services. Iowa natural gas prices are monthly and in $/1000 cubic feet, 
provided by EIA. OPIS weekly reports provide spot prices for methanol at the US gulf coast in 
 3 
$/gallon, and crude glycerin prices at FOB Midwest in $/lb. Chicago Ultra Low Sulfur Diesel 
(ULSD) and biodiesel weekly spot prices were also collected from the OPIS reports.  
To answer our research question on the linkages between biodiesel and soybean oil we 
follow Mallory, Irwin and Hayes (2012) who apply structural and time-series approaches to 
investigate ethanol and corn market linkages. We build a conceptual link between the markets 
and use a non-profit structural model that estimates the breakeven biodiesel price. We then use a 
time series analysis to crosscheck the structural model results that includes a vector error 
correction model. We extend their time series approach by incorporating a more recent test for 
structural breaks.  
1.4 Overview  
Our work is presented in this thesis as chapters. Chapter 2 sets the stage for the reader to 
understand the workings of the biodiesel industry. It first address the biodiesel production 
process, discusses the characteristics of the biodiesel industry in the US, reviews government 
incentives, and supply and use. . Chapter 3 reviews the literature on the biodiesel industry in the 
US. In addition to highlighting economic feasibility studies, this chapter reviews relevant 
literature on the biofuel and agricultural market linkages. Chapter 4 explains the economic theory 
that is relevant to our work in the biodiesel market and the data and methodology used in detail, 
both for the structural and the time series analysis. Chapter 5 presents the results and discusses 
their implications. Chapter 6 concludes. 
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2. THE BIODIESEL INDUSTRY 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the reader with important background information about the US 
biodiesel market. Section 2.2 discusses the biodiesel production process and its chemical 
characteristics. Section 2.3 gives an overview of feedstock use, plant capacity and distribution 
and infrastructure of the biodiesel market in the US. Section 2.4 outlines the government 
incentives for the biodiesel industry in the US. Section 2.5 discusses US biodiesel supply and 
demand. Section 2.6 provides a summary. 
      2.2 Biodiesel Production Process 
 Biodiesel can be produced from animal fat or virgin vegetable oil. Any vegetable oil is a 
triglyceride, which contains three fatty acids and glycerol. The triglyceride is reacted with 
methanol in the presence of an alkaline catalyst in a large reactor (Figure 1). In the phase that 
follows, the products of the process of transesterification are centrifuged to separate crude 
biodiesel from glycerin. The crude biodiesel is then neutralized and washed with acid water to 
remove the alkaline catalyst. At that point, the biodiesel still contains some methanol and thus is 
further centrifuged to remove it; producing what is known as wet biodiesel. Finally, the biodiesel 
in its conventional form is acquired by evaporating the water in an ester-drying process. As for 
the glycerin, it is treated with an acid in a separation process that removes Free Fatty Acids, 
followed by a distillation process to recover methanol producing wet glycerin. Finally water is 
recovered and crude glycerin in its conventional form is produced (Pradhan, 2011).   
 5 
The US Department of Energy provides, on its Biodiesel Production and Distribution 
page, estimates of the conversion rates for this process using soybean oil as the feedstock, where 
100 pounds of soybean oil and 10 pounds of methanol produce 100 pounds of biodiesel and 10 
pounds of glycerin. If converted into gallons
1
, 
                                                                         (1) 
Per the Biodiesel Handling and Use Guide posted on the USDA website in 2009
2
, 
biodiesel that is made from vegetable oil and methanol has a cetane number, the equivalent of 
the ethanol octane, which is comparable or higher than that of No.2 diesel. A higher cetane 
number provides easier starting, quieter operation of the engine and higher lubricity. Biodiesel 
also has a higher flash point (Szulczyk, 2010). A flash point is the minimum temperature at 
which biodiesel ignites. This property makes biodiesel less favorable in colder climates, but over 
all a safer fuel. Additionally, it contains minimal amounts sulfur
3
, no aromatics and a higher 
content of oxygen (Canakci, 2001). 
Biodiesel is available in pure, B100, or blend forms. Common blends in the US are B5, and 
B20. B20 is the most commonly used blend due to its compatibility with diesel engines (USDA, 
2009). It has only 1 or 2% less energy content than petroleum diesel while maintaining its high 
cetane number. Blends of B50 and above are not as commonly used due to unsuitability for use 
in diesel engines without modification. B100 starts to cloud
4
 at 30 F
0
 to 60 F
0
, which is higher 
than the cloud temperature of most diesel fuels. As it clouds it becomes more viscous and 
increases the chance of damage to the fuel pump. It can also degrade materials that are used in 
                                                          
1
 Using the biodiesel calculator provided by Renewable Energy Group http://www.soypower.com/calculator.asp 
2 http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb1045416.pdf. 
3
 Usually required for lubrication 
4 Clouding refers to the formation of crystals 
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hoses and gaskets. Finally, it has 8% less energy content per gallon than petroleum diesel. Yet, 
pure biodiesel has considerably lower diesel particulate matter (DPM) emissions than diesel fuel 
and is thus preferred for use in the underground mining industry where air contaminants become 
highly concentrated
5
 (MSHA, 2011).  
2.3  Overview of the US Biodiesel Industry   
In the US, biodiesel is produced mostly from vegetable oil, namely soybean oil. The US 
is a major world producer of soybeans and soybean oil, especially in Midwestern states. The EIA 
estimates that soybean oil, although more expensive than alternative feedstocks such as yellow 
grease or corn oil, accounted for 55% of feedstock used for biodiesel in 2012
 
(Figure 2). Soybean 
oil remains most plausible due to its superior chemical combination and availability.  Soybean 
oil contains much less Free Fatty Acids (FFA) than alternative cheaper feedstocks. Increased 
content of FFA
6
 creates soap when reacting with the alkaline catalyst. The formation of soap 
results in a slower conversion rate of the methanol and the feedstock into biodiesel and inhibits 
the separation of the methanol from the glycerin byproduct at later stages of production 
(Hasheminejad et al., 2011). 
 Technology that reduces FFA is available and involves treatment of the feedstock with 
an acidic catalyst before applying the alkaline catalyst. However, there are other issues with 
alternative feedstocks that limit their use. For example, being a byproduct of the food industry, 
yellow grease has limited supply especially in areas that are far from urban centers. Thus, its cost 
effectiveness is restricted by location and size of operation. Its scarcity makes it unfeasible for 
use as the sole feedstock for large operations (Moss, 2012). Similarly, corn oil has limited 
                                                          
5
 DPM are air contaminants that are linked with heart and lung disease and are present underground at much higher 
concentration than above ground. B100 meets the U.S. Mining Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) 
contaminants exposure standards.  
6
 FFA are radical fatty acids around the glycerin backbone of the triglyceride 
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supply. In 2011, only 35% of US ethanol plants performed the extraction process required to 
obtain inedible corn oil - separating fat from the Distiller Dried Grains (DDGs) byproduct 
(Kotrba, 2011)7. 
Biodiesel Magazine provides a self -reported US biodiesel plant list
8
 with the location, 
feedstock technology and production capacity for each plant. We use this list to describe the 
present US biodiesel industry. We first note that US biodiesel production capacity has increased 
drastically over the past decade. The production capacity increased from 2 million gallons in 
2000 to 250 million gallons in 2006 and reached about 900 million by 2007
9
. 2007 appears to 
have marked a year of significant growth in capacity. The current capacity is approximately 2.9 
billion gallons as reported by 193 plants, some of which are idle. Biodiesel plant distribution is 
skewed towards the East Coast and the Midwest regions as illustrated by Figure (3). In terms of 
states, Texas, California and Iowa have the largest number of plants, respectively. Over 55% of 
the plants in the US can be categorized as small, with a capacity of 5 million gallons or less, and 
13% are large with a capacity of over 30 million gallons (Figure 4). Referring to Figure (3), we 
find that plants outside of the Midwest are predominantly small, ranging between a capacity of 
0.1 and 7 million gallons of biodiesel. In fact, the Midwestern states encompass 28% of all 
biodiesel plants and 54% of all large-scale plants nationwide. 
According to the same data source, over 60% of biodiesel plants report that they are 
designed to use multiple types of feedstock. Plants that cannot process feedstock other than 
soybean oil (yellow grease) make up only 14% (18%) of all production facilities (Figure 5). 
Plants that use soybean oil exclusively are clustered in the Midwestern states, while yellow 
                                                          
7 This potentially is due to the effect on the quality of DDGs as feed. Yet, the share of corn oil used as biodiesel 
feedstock is expected to increase as more ethanol plants move towards co-location biodiesel production 
8 http://www.biodieselmagazine.com/plants/listplants/USA/ 
9 http://www.card.iastate.edu/iowa_ag_review/spring_07/article4.aspx 
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grease-exclusive plants are more commonly found around urban centers on the East and West 
Coasts. Note that, 31% of the large plants nationwide use soybean oil exclusively for production, 
while only 3% of the large plants depend exclusively on yellow grease. 
  Finally, US infrastructure for biodiesel is less developed in comparison to other 
fuels. Pure biodiesel erodes storage and transportation pipes material such as metal, common 
types of plastic and rubber. It is also a less stable fuel and biodegrades faster than Ultra Low 
Sulfur Diesel (ULSD) especially if in contact with water. Thus, biodiesel blends are more 
plausible for transportation. B20 blends however are allowed to use ULSD transportation pipes 
(Mushrush, 2011). 
2.4 Policies and Government Incentives   
 Government incentives are significant factors in the evolution of the biodiesel market. 
The first biodiesel incentive, a supply-side production incentive, was the USDA Bioenergy 
Program that started in 2001, expanded in 2002 and ended in 2006 (Figure 6). The program 
supported biodiesel and ethanol production through direct payments to producers to compensate 
for feedstock costs. It compensated producers with one unit of feedstock for every 2.5 units used 
in facilities of less than 65 million gallons annual production capacity and one unit of feedstock 
for every 3.5 units used in facilities with production capacity larger than 65 million gallon. With 
a budget of $150 million each fiscal year, the program support amounted to $204
10
 million 
dollars over 2002-2006 (USDA FAS, 2012). The Program was reinstated in 2009. However, it 
was much less effective because in addition to the funding ceiling of the program, feedstock 
                                                          
10
 This value was a result of having other federal and state level incentives introduced around that period. Some of 
which were more appealing to blenders.  
 9 
prices were much higher in 2009 than 2002-2006, and with notably higher plant capacity the 
payments to producers in units of feedstock were much lower. 
  On the demand side, the Federal Tax Credit was introduced in 2004 under the American 
Job Creation Act. With the tax credit, a $1 per gallon credit was given to blenders of petroleum 
diesel with biodiesel made from soybean oil and $0.50 for blenders of biodiesel made from 
recycled oil (USDA FAS, 2012). The IRS amended and extended the tax credit in 2006 for two 
more years. Under the 2006 extension, the $1 per gallon tax cut was given to blenders without 
restriction on feedstock type, company size or level of production. Over time, the tax credit 
replaced the Bioenergy Program as a key federal incentive for the biodiesel industry. Up until 
2009 the tax credit continued to be extended. However, in 2010 this incentive began to be less 
consistent. The tax credit expired in 2010, but was reinstated in 2011 retroactively, and it expires 
again the end of 2011. Finally, the tax credit was reinstated retroactively in 2013 (Figure 6).  
  Another demand side policy for US biofuel domestic consumption was the issuance of 
the first renewable fuel volume mandate by the Environmental Policy Act in 2005. The first 
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS1) mandated that 7.5 billion gallons of renewable fuel would be 
blended with petroleum fuel by 2012. Biodiesel was eligible to fulfill this requirement and was 
implicitly incentivized as it was assigned a higher credit value than corn-based ethanol
11
. 
However, there was no explicit sub-mandate regarding its use and almost this entire requirement 
was fulfilled through corn-based ethanol. However, the amended renewable fuel standard, RFS2, 
enacted in December 2007 as part of the Energy and Independence and Security Act (US EPA, 
                                                          
11
 This was through the renewable identification numbers (RINs) equivalence value. RINs are the method used to 
ensure the use of the mandated biofuel amount. Whenever a biofuel batch is produced or imported a RIN is attached 
to it. RINs are then sold to blenders with the physical biofuel. RINs are tradable and can be rolled over from one 
year to the other such that in one year a blender may choose to use more biofuel than required for compliance and 
sell or use the extra RINs for compliance with the obligation of later years.  
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2012), was more crucial to biodiesel industry. Effective July 2008, the mandated amount of 
renewable fuel was increased from 7.5 billion gallons in 2012 to 36 billion gallons in 2022. 
RFS2 also amended standards and divided renewable fuel into advanced and total renewable 
fuel
12
. RFS2 identified biodiesel, cellulosic biofuel, and undifferentiated categories
13
 as 
Advanced Fuels. Mandating a total of 21 billion gallons of Advanced Fuels in 2022, RFS2 set 
minimum volume requirements of 1, 4 and 16 billion gallons for each of biodiesel, 
undifferentiated advanced and cellulosic categories in 2022, respectively (Figure 7). Total 
renewable fuel was mandated to make up no more than 15 billion gallons of the RFS2 mandate. 
The EPA administration is responsible for annually setting the mandate for the advanced fuels 
(US EIA, 2012).  The mandate is set based on the expectation for US fuel consumption for a 
certain year. It also factors in the accuracy of the consumption forecast for the preceding year. 
EPA adjusts the mandate based on whether the consumption was overestimated or 
underestimated (de Gorter et al., 2009). Figure (8) indicates how the biodiesel mandate has been 
increased gradually.  
 A number of aspects of RFS2 give biodiesel a demand advantage over other renewable 
fuel. In addition to fulfilling its own volumetric requirement, biodiesel is eligible to fulfill other 
categories, namely, the undifferentiated and renewable requirement. Additionally, RFS2 counts 
one physical gallon of biodiesel to equal 1.5 gallons of ethanol due to its higher energy content 
14
(Thompson et al., 2010). Finally, cellulosic biofuels mandate requirements have continuously 
been set to be much lower than the initial volumetric requirement. With the unchanged total 
advanced fuel mandate, biodiesel has had the opportunity to fill this gap.  
                                                          
12
 An advanced fuel provides a 50% reduction in Greenhouse Gas relative to the petroleum fuel it replaces. On the 
other hand, total renewable fuel provides only 20% reduction in Greenhouse Gas. 
13
 Undifferentiated includes any advanced biofuel, sugar-based biofuels, renewable diesel that is co-processed with 
petroleum, biodiesel and cellulosic or any advanced biofuels that may exist in the future. 
14
 This causes biodiesel RINs to be more valuable than ethanol RINs. They are an advanced fuel RIN. 
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 In addition to Federal biodiesel policy, state level support of biodiesel exists. It first 
started in 2003 when Minnesota passed legislation requiring fuel diesel to be blended with 
biodiesel at 98% or B2. Currently, Minnesota has increased its requirement to B10 and intends to 
reach B20 by 2015 (US EIA, 2012). Oregon instituted a requirement of B5 in 2007 Pennsylvania 
and Washington started mandates of B2 blends effective 2009 and New York and Vermont 
introduced a blend requirement for heating oil in 2012.    
 The US is not the only country that has introduced legislation that supports the biodiesel 
industry. The EU, Brazil and Argentina, among others, have similar government policies 
regarding the biodiesel industry. Through the EU Directive in 2003, it was established that each 
of the European Union members must define a national mandate for biofuel consumption with a 
binding target for renewable fuel to make up to 5.75% of all transportation diesel in 2010 (Serra, 
2012). Each country in the EU has its own target to be achieved by 2020 for the percentage of 
energy from renewable sources as part of overall consumption of energy. This is also achieved 
through mandates and tax exemptions. In 2010 the EU increased its standard blend to B7 and its 
renewable fuel target to 10%. The EU had a primary production of approximately 2.8 billion 
gallons (European Commision, 2012) of biodiesel in 2010 and an inland consumption of 3.3 
billion gallons suggesting that it is a large importer of biodiesel. Of the all member states, 
Germany held the leading position in both production and inland consumption from 2005 until 
2010. The European Biodiesel Board estimates France Spain, Italy and Belgium follow in terms 
of production.  Finally, the major feedstock for EU biodiesel is canola oil. Palm, sunflower seed 
and soybean oil are also used.  
 The government of Brazil supports the biodiesel industry through the National Program 
for the Production and Use of Biodiesel (PNPB). Starting in 2004, the program began giving tax 
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credits for any biodiesel production. It also gives complete tax exemption for biodiesel produced 
in specific areas in the country where rural development is an objective such as the North and 
Northeast. The government introduced blending mandates in 2005 with required blends of B2 by 
2008 and B5 in 2013. Brazilian production of biodiesel reached 706 million gallons in 2012. Yet 
the country has a large excess capacity and is expected to produce more in the future. Finally, the 
major feedstock in Brazil is soybean oil, accounting for 82% of the biodiesel production (Garcez 
et al. 2009).   
Argentina is one of the largest producers of soybean oil. Like Europe, the Argentine 
transportation system relies heavily on diesel. The biodiesel policy started in 2006 and is divided 
based on end markets since exports make up over 50% of biodiesel production. Biodiesel 
production for domestic use enjoys a number of tax exemptions and reimbursement. They are 
also eligible for a direct subsidy. Production for foreign use however is not supported by 
government incentives and is subject to an export tax (USDA FAS, 2012). Spain used to be the 
main export market until the enactment of the new EU import restriction on non-EU biodiesel.  
As of 2010 Argentina has a blending mandate of B7.5. The production of biodiesel reached 793 
million gallons in 2012.   
2.5 US Biodiesel Supply and Use 
US biodiesel supply and use have fluctuated substantially in the last decade. Figure (9) 
indicates growth in the US biodiesel market. Biodiesel commercial production in 2001 was 
approximately 9 million gallons but increased almost a hundred times to reach almost 967 
million gallon within 10 years. Similarly consumption was approximately 10 million gallons and 
increased to 878 million gallons for the same time period.  
 13 
It appears that the enactment of the 2004 Tax Credit had an impact on the production. 
Production experienced an increase starting in 2004 with a boom in 2006. The boom peaked and 
ended in 2008 after which production declined sharply. Consumption followed the increasing 
trend since 2004 but did not experience a peak in 2008. Although on the rise, domestic 
consumption accounted for less than half of the production in 2008.Thus, the boom in production 
is unlikely to be in response to an increase in domestic consumption.  
Looking at Figure (10), we deduce that the peaks in exports and imports are correlated 
with increased production in 2008 as exports and imports continued to decline after that year. In 
fact, exports to the European Union and other countries began to be significant in 2006 and 
reached a peak in 2008 making up 68% of total biodiesel supply
15
 (US EIA, 2012). The 
European Union is the world largest producer and consumer of biodiesel. It is a net importer and 
was the largest export market for U.S. producers prior to 2009.  
Here the effect of the tax credit is emphasized. This incentive was applicable to foreign-
origin biodiesel that had been blended in the US. US producers would “splash and dash”, mix in 
biodiesel locally produced, as well as imports from Southeast Asia and Argentina, with minimal 
amounts of diesel. This enabled them to take advantage of the tax credit and re-export the B99 
blend. At such a low price, European producers could not compete with the imported biodiesel. 
In 2008, the European commission initiated an antidumping and countervailing investigation. As 
a result, duties on blends higher than B20 were imposed effective March of 2009. The imposed 
duties resulted in the collapse of the US biodiesel sector. Exports shrunk by over half from 2008 
to 2009. The “splash and dash” practice was eliminated by the end of 2009. The tax credit 
became only applicable to biodiesel that is originated from the US regardless of the export 
                                                          
15 Both imports and domestic production  
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destination. However, the EU was able to impose tariffs on US biodiesel for five years starting 
2009 due to that practice (de Gorter et al. 2011). Australia and Peru followed suit after 2009 
resulting in a further decline in US exports in 2010.  
Beginning in 2009 biodiesel production and consumption begin to track each other very 
closely. Both consumption and production experience a decline in 2009 and then begin to 
recover in 2010. This could be explained by the declining impact of the export market in addition 
to the impact of the RFS2 on the market. This relationship would be expected if the mandate is 
binding. The RFS2 coupled with the reinstatement of the tax credit in 2011 contributed to the 
increase in production and consumption. Here, the demand side incentives implicitly increased 
supply
16
.  
2.6 Summary  
This chapter presented background information about the biodiesel market in the US 
necessary to understand the economics of this market. This information covers the biodiesel 
production process, aspects of the US biodiesel market such as feedstock use, capacity and 
distribution, US government incentives, and US biodiesel supply and use. 
The first section discusses the process with which biodiesel is produced. The inputs for 
biodiesel production are a triglyceride and methanol and base catalyst. Glycerin is a byproduct 
for biodiesel. The section also provides an estimate for the conversion rates and chemical 
characteristics. Biodiesel has a number of chemical characteristics that make it superior to diesel. 
However, it is more commonly used in blends rather than pure form due to those chemical 
characteristics.    
                                                          
16  Although passed in 2007, the RFS2 was effective 18 months later. Thus, we would only see its impact on supply 
and use starting mid-2009. 
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The second section describes the biodiesel industry in the US in terms of feedstock use, 
plant distribution capacity, and infrastructure. Despite the fact that many plants in the US are 
designed to use multiple feedstocks and more plants are equipped to depend on yellow grease 
alone rather than soybean oil alone, soybean oil remains to be at the top feedstock used in the 
US. We find this to be reasonable since use of yellow grease is subject to facility size and 
location. Bigger plants, although fewer, tend to utilize soybean oil. The US has excess biodiesel 
capacity that is mainly clustered in the Midwest and East Coast. Finally, US biodiesel 
transportation infrastructure is still underdeveloped.  
The third section discussed government incentives with regards to biodiesel. The US 
government has a number of policies to push the biodiesel sector including the Tax Credit 
instated in 2004 and the second Renewable Fuel Standards mandate enacted in 2007. 
Additionally, many states have enforced mandates for biodiesel use even before some of the 
federal incentives existed. Other countries as well, such as the EU, Brazil and Argentina have a 
variety of tax credit, subsidies and set mandate that support the biodiesel market.   
The fourth section discussed the biodiesel supply and use in the US. The market 
experienced a number of ups and downs ever since it came to life due to its substantial 
dependency on government policy and export market. The Federal Tax Credit of 2004 was the 
main policy that caused a major increase in biodiesel production in the years after that. Based on 
it, the practice of “splash and dash” occurred allowing increased exports. The ban on imports 
from the US to the EU and a number of other countries and the suspension of the Tax Credit 
caused the market to crash. Later the RFS2 and the reinstatement of the tax credit revived the 
market. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter reviews studies and publications relevant to our work. The chapter is divided 
into two parts – Economic Feasibility and Profitability studies and Commodity and Energy 
Markets Linkage studies. Studies in the first group are economic engineering studies that attempt 
to estimate the feasibility of biodiesel production based on some input variables and a production 
technology. Studies in the second group utilize formal time series tests and modeling to 
investigate the relationship between biofuels and agricultural commodity markets. Taken 
together, this review helps the reader understand how research has tackled the question of 
linkages between biofuel and commodity markets.  
3.2 Economic Feasibility and Profitability Studies  
 
 The economic feasibility of biodiesel production has received quite a bit of attention in 
the literature. A number of economic engineering studies investigate aspects of the biodiesel 
industry relevant to investment decisions. The cost of a biodiesel unit and technical factors that 
impact profitability are issues that have been investigated for over a decade. The literature 
overwhelmingly suggests that biodiesel production is quite costly and is often affected by 
feedstock cost and plant size.  
 Bender (1999) presents an overview of 12 economic engineering studies that estimate the 
costs of production for biodiesel from both vegetable oil and animal fats. According to his 
review, studies found soybean oil to be the least costly vegetable oil in biodiesel production at 
$1.13/gal, while canola oil was found to be the most expensive at a cost of $2.61/gal of biodiesel. 
For the soybean oil study, the model allows for meal credit, contributing to cost reduction. 
Finally, the review concluded that biodiesel was not economically profitable at the time. 
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 Fortenbery (2005) considers two plants in Wisconsin, with four and ten million gallon-
production capacity. The analysis is conducted using both yellow grease production technology 
and soybean oil production technology for both plants. The results suggest that for both sizes 
biodiesel production is not profitable. Paulson and Ginder (2007) study the profitability of two 
continuous flow plants of sizes of 30 and 60 million gallons capacities. The feedstock used is a 
mixture of soybean oil accounting for 70% and animal fat accounting for 30%. Among a number 
of findings, they find that the bigger the plant size the more cost effective the plant. Using a 
sensitivity analysis they find that feedstock cost has the largest impact on biodiesel cost as it 
makes up 85% of overall cost of production.  Finally, the model finds that glycerin and other co-
product credits contribute a negligible amount to reduction in biodiesel cost.  
 Other research utilizes process simulation software to model a production plant to 
estimate the cost and economic feasibility of biodiesel. Haas et al. (2006) use the ASPEN 
PLUS
17
 process simulation software to model the production of biodiesel that meets ASTM 
specifications
 18
. A plant of 100 million gallons capacity is studied using 2003 cost 
specifications. The alkali-based production process uses soybean oil with a negligible content of 
free fatty acids. Their calculations estimate the biodiesel production cost to be $2.00/gal. Again, 
the cost of feedstock accounts for 88% of overall cost, thus a sensitivity analysis for fluctuation 
in soybean oil prices is performed.  The results suggest that a linear relationship governs the 
impact of changes in the price of feedstock to the biodiesel cost of production. A change of 
$0.01/lb. in soybean oil price results in a $0.75/gal change in biodiesel cost. Another study by 
You et al. (2008) also analyzes the biodiesel production from soybean oil in plants with 
capacities of 2.19, 8.2, and 27.4 million gallons a year in Taiwan. They simulate a biodiesel plant 
                                                          
17
 A computer aided software that uses the underlying physical relationships to predict the performance of a process.  
18
 The American Society for Testing and Materials 
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using HYprotech SYStem software. Their findings suggest that only at a capacity of 27.4 million 
gallons a year may the biodiesel from soybean oil be profitable.  
 It is important to note that the technical conversion rates for the alkali-based production 
process have not changed drastically over time. Fortenbery (2005) uses conversion rates of 
inputs into biodiesel of 7.5 lb./gal and 0.14 lb./gal for soybean oil and methanol, respectively. 
Haas et al. (2006) uses conversion rates of 7.4 lb. /gal and 0.74 lb. /gal and 6.6 cubic feet, for 
soybean oil, methanol, and natural gas, respectively. Paulson and Ginder (2007) use conversion 
rates of 10 lb./gal, 1 lb./gal of feedstock and methanol, respectively. 
 Finally, some literature applies process simulation programs to provide information about 
cheaper alternatives to the standard alkali process. Frequently cited in the literature is Zhang et 
al. (2003). Based on a previous research paper by the same authors, a HYprotech SYStem 
computational model simulates four plants with a capacity of 2.19 million gallons/year, each 
using a different production technology. The processes are alkali-catalyzed production using 
canola oil, alkali production using waste cooking oil and acidic catalyzed production using waste 
cooking oil with a recovery process that uses water and then another with a recovery process that 
uses hexane. Their findings suggest that the alkali catalyzed processes that uses waste cooking 
oil is most costly. The process involving canola oil is the second most costly. The conducted 
sensitivity analysis indicates that plant size, feedstock type, and the price of biodiesel are the 
factors that most impact the costliness of a process. Later, West et al. (2008) and Lee et al. 
(2011) run similar tests for triolein also using the HYSYS and find that alkali catalyzed methods 
are least cost effective.  
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3.3 Commodity and Energy Markets Linkage studies 
Plenty of academic research attempts to pin down the relationship between energy and 
agricultural markets. A wide set of publications study the relationship between crude oil and 
agricultural commodities. Study of ethanol in such a context received similar attention. However, 
the linkage between biodiesel and its feedstock is not widely researched, as biodiesel has been 
overcrowded by its more widely used and more profitable kin, ethanol. Early work suggests a 
long run no profit relationship is likely to govern the price relationship between agricultural 
commodities and biofuels.  
  Campiche et al. (2007) use a vector error correction model (VECM) to examine the short 
and long run relationship for spot price data of corn, sugar, sorghum, soybeans and soybean oil 
and palm oil from 2003-2007. They only find evidence of an equilibrium relationship in the long 
run after 2006 and only in soybeans and corn. They attribute their results to 2006 marking a 
boom year for US biofuel industry. Serra et al. (2008) also study this relationship using a smooth 
transition vector error correction model
19
. The paper finds that a long-run equilibrium exists 
between daily futures prices of US ethanol, crude oil, and corn prices from 2005-2007. They also 
find a single long run relationship in the price series, with ethanol as the market that adjusts to 
deviations from the long run parity. 
Zhang et al. (2010) use a VECM to investigate the impact of crude oil and biofuel 
production on a number of agricultural commodities. They use monthly price data for ethanol, 
gasoline, corn, rice, soybeans, sugar and wheat from March 1989 through July 2008. However, 
they find no evidence of a long run cointegration between the energy and agricultural markets. 
Saghaian (2010) also uses the same methodology with monthly prices of crude oil, ethanol, corn, 
                                                          
19 This allows for smooth transition between regimes that captures the fact that not all regime switching happens 
abruptly 
 20 
wheat and soybeans from January 1996 to December 2008. The paper finds a co-integrating 
relationship between the commodities and identify the direction of causality, from oil to ethanol, 
wheat, corn and soybeans and from soybeans and wheat to ethanol, and from ethanol to corn. In 
their study about the spillover of volatility from energy to agricultural markets, Trujillo-Berrara 
et al. (2011) run VECM for ethanol, corn and crude oil prices in the US. They find evidence of a 
cointegration relationship and direction of causality from corn to ethanol volitality. Du and 
McPhail (2012) find similar results as they examine the dynamic relationship between ethanol, 
gasoline and corn prices using daily settlement prices from 2005-2011. They use MGARCH and 
SVAR to find a long run relationship between ethanol and corn prices and corn and gasoline 
prices exists only after March 2008.  
Mallory, Irwin and Hayes (2012) study the relationship between corn, ethanol and natural 
gas and gasoline in a more comprehensive fashion. The paper attempts to understand the 
linkages between the corn and the energy markets through testing for a long-run non-profit 
relationship that had been widely mentioned in the literature but with mixed evidence. They 
reason that the ethanol, corn and natural gas markets are subject to the theory of competitive 
markets, where ease of entry and exit allows for a non-profit relationship to hold in the long run. 
They also reason for that purpose, one year forward prices will better reflect this relationship 
than current prices. Yet, the relationship will be transferred to the current prices from future 
prices through cost of carry linkages. Thus, if a cointegration relationship existed one year out it 
would be transmitted back to the nearby future prices through the theory of supply of storage. 
To investigate this they follow two empirical approaches. The first is a non-profit 
structural model that estimates the breakeven corn price over the time period. Their hypothesis 
suggests that if a non-profit long run relationship exists then the actual corn price must be close 
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to the derived breakeven price. Based on daily nearby prices and one year to maturity prices 
from July 30, 2006 to February 10, 2012, they utilize the zero-profit function for an Iowa ethanol 
plant to obtain the breakeven price for corn and ethanol. They include fixed costs in the 
breakeven equation to account for the long run dimension of the non-profit relationship. The 
findings from this approach enable them to identify that the long run non-profit relationship 
holds after 2006. 
In their second approach, they obtain statistical evidence using a VECM model that 
accounts for a structural break in September 2010. They identify the break based on the 
substantial increase in ethanol exports in that period. Using the likelihood ratio test, they find 
support for the presence of the structural break. The model accounting for a structural break fits 
the data better than a model for the entire sample. Their statistical model additionally finds that a 
long run non-profit equilibrium relationship holds in the one year to maturity prices, but not in 
the nearby prices sample. Finally, they are only able to identify Granger causality from corn to 
ethanol and natural gas markets in the period prior to the structural break in the one-year to 
maturity dataset.   
While evidently studies with regard to ethanol and crude oil are plentiful, literature that 
studies biodiesel linkages to agricultural commodity markets are less numerous. However, some 
literature implies the long run relationship without testing for it. Gohin (2008) uses a 
computational general equilibrium model of the EU-15 to project the impact of the European 
Union biodiesel policy on domestic agricultural markets and livestock markets in 2015. Based on 
a number of assumptions, the paper finds that world prices of canola oil and soybean oil will 
increase by 10% and 33.6% respectively by 2015 as a result of higher demand for biodiesel 
production. While prices of soybean and canola meal decline, as they become abundant with 
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higher vegetable oil production, the prices of oilseeds increase. Although not explicitly stated in 
this study, the results imply the presence of a long run relationship between biodiesel and its 
feedstock. A more recent paper by Timilsina et al. (2011) also uses a computational general 
equilibrium model to test the long run impact of two biofuel usage target scenarios on land use, 
food supply and agricultural commodity prices in 2020. The impact on a number of developing 
and developed countries is studied for both ethanol and biodiesel. Their findings go in line with 
the previous paper suggesting that prices of agricultural commodities including soybean oil, corn 
and palm oil in fact increase over time with the expanding biofuel industry.  
Studies that focus their empirical work directly on the long run non-profit relationship 
between biodiesel and agricultural commodity markets are very few and recent. Schulz (2012) 
studies the long run relationship of German biodiesel prices, crude oil and canola prices in order 
to determine the volatility linkages in these markets. Using weekly spot prices of biodiesel and 
futures prices for canola and diesel (2002-2012), the paper applies a VECM and MGARCH 
model and multivariate multiplicative volatility model estimation to test for volatility impacts. 
VECM results suggest that a long run relationship between biodiesel, oil and canola exists. 
Further, the paper suggests that the adjustment to deviation from the equilibrium occurs in the 
biodiesel market, the other variables being weakly exogenous. Thus, biodiesel has little influence 
on the prices of crude oil and canola in the long run and no influence at all in the short run. 
Shultz (2012) explains that the presence of such a relationship was expected since the price of 
the feedstock accounts for large portion of the biodiesel production cost. Similarly, the 
relationship with crude oil prices results from its substitutability with biodiesel. Results from the 
volatility tests indicate that the biodiesel industry does not affect the volatility of food or crude 
oil markets.  
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 Hassouneh et al. (2012) support the Shultz (2012) results. Applying weekly Spanish spot 
prices for biodiesel, crude oil and sunflower from 2006-2010 to a parametric VECM, they 
investigate the relationship between biodiesel, crude oil and sunflower oil. They further use a 
non- parametric MLPR technique to test the accuracy of the VECM results. MLPR makes no 
assumptions about the linearity of the price datasets. Results from the Johansen test indicate the 
presence of a long run equilibrium between the commodities in question where sunflower and 
crude oil are weakly exogenous. Thus, the biodiesel market adjusts to deviations away from the 
equilibrium. The VECM further suggests that crude oil is capable of influencing biodiesel prices 
not only in the long run but also in the short run. However, biodiesel prices influence sunflower 
prices only in the short run.  Furthermore, the MLPR model finds that as long as the equilibrium 
relationship holds, the transfer of price increase in the feedstock will transfer faster to the 
biodiesel market than a decrease in its price. Again, they conclude that biodiesel shows limited 
capacity to influence agricultural commodity prices. 
 Busse et al. (2012) use a regime-dependent Markov-Switching VECM to study the 
relationship between crude oil, soybean oil, canola oil and biodiesel in Germany without the 
assumption of structural stability. In addition to empirical evidence they build a theoretical 
framework for the biodiesel industry in Germany under a tax credit and a mandate. Using weekly 
spot prices from 2002-2008 under different policy interferences, they conduct standard unit root 
and Johansen cointegration tests and recognize the presence of a number of regimes in the long 
run equilibrium cointegration relationship. Their tests show that the equilibrium in the long run is 
maintained regardless of policy shocks. Such government incentives only cause short run 
responses. Similar to the previous two studies this one concludes that crude oil prices drive 
biodiesel prices.  Unlike the other two studies, here biodiesel prices influence canola and 
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soybean oil prices especially in periods where significant growth in the biodiesel sector was 
witnessed. 
3.4 Summary  
 
This chapter reviewed literature pertaining to the economic feasibility of biodiesel and the 
linkages between biofuel and commodity markets. This gives the reader a background of the 
approach with which this question has been addressed and the scope and limitations of the 
currently available academic work.   
The first section reviewed a number of economic engineering studies. These studies 
investigate the economic profitability of biodiesel based on its production process. Some 
research uses capital budgeting models while other utilizes process simulation software. A few 
studies investigate the profitability of the alkali process relative to other production technologies. 
The section shows that most of the studies indicate that biodiesel production is not profitable and 
that the biodiesel conversion rate of inputs has not changed significantly over time.  
The second section reviewed literature that studies the relationship between biofuel feedstock 
and the energy markets. Most of the literature uses a vector error correction model (VECM) to 
investigate these linkages. With regard to the US biofuels market, the ethanol market has been 
discussed extensively. Most studies found a long run equilibrium relationship to exist between 
ethanol and agricultural commodities. Evidence of such linkages in the biodiesel market also 
exists.   
Available literature on biodiesel and feedstock linkages is concentrated geographically on the 
European Union. Although implied, this relationship has not been studied for the US biodiesel 
markets. Our research will shed a light on biodiesel-feedstock market linkages in the US using 
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non-profit structural techniques and time series techniques. The objective of this paper is to fill 
this gap in the literature by investigating the relationship between Iowa biodiesel and soybean oil 
prices. To achieve this, we develop a conceptual link between the markets and provide evidence 
for it using two empirical tests similar to Mallory, Irwin and Hayes (2012). We begin by using a 
non-profit structural model that enables us to estimate the breakeven biodiesel price and compare 
it to the market price. We then use a vector error correction model and the Kejriwal and Perron 
(2010) procedure to crosscheck our findings. To our knowledge no other paper studies the US 
biodiesel market linkage to its feedstock using either one of the approaches.  
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4. THEORY, DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The chapter introduces the application of structural and time series approaches to testing 
the relationship between US biodiesel and soybean oil market. Section 4.2 discusses the 
biodiesel market in light of economic theory and the economic implications of some aspects of 
the market that are important to our research; we identify these aspects to be government 
intervention and excess capacity. Section 4.3 describes the data that is used for our model. 
Section 4.4 describes the specifications of the structural model. Section 4.5 discusses the 
empirical approach we follow to study the biodiesel market including formal time series tests for 
cointegration and structural breaks. Section 4.6 provides a summary. 
4.2 Theory 
4.2.1 The Biodiesel Market and the Theory of Perfectly Competitive Markets  
Prices have a very important function as a market signal to producers and consumers. In a 
perfectly competitive market, price-taking firms will produce at a point where their marginal cost 
is equal to the price offered by the market. An equilibrium price reflects a balance between the 
demand and supply in the market. Suppliers will respond to shocks that impact the price by 
either expanding or contracting their operations. In the short run, market players have little 
capacity to react.  However, in the long run with no cost to entry or exit, per the perfectly 
competitive model assumptions, they have a chance to respond fully to the change in available 
profit.  
If there are positive profits to be made, existing firms will expand or new firms will enter the 
market sufficiently until there are no profits to be had. Alternatively, if the profits in the market 
are negative, firms will leave the market sufficiently restricting output and returning to the 
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equilibrium quantity and price. Thus, a non-profit condition where the firm’s average cost is 
equivalent to the price is forced upon the producers by the market mechanism.  
This model suggests that the equilibrium price level is reached in markets that are 
competitive and contestable. Although the biodiesel market could not be classified as perfectly 
efficient due to the degree of government intervention, we expect such an equilibrium 
relationship to hold since the market has plenty of excess capacity, easing the process of market 
entry and exit. In other words, although not necessarily perfectly competitive, the biodiesel 
market is contestable. Since soybean oil is a key input in the US for biodiesel we expect an 
equilibrium relationship to exist between the two regardless of the direction of the causality.  
4.2.2 The Implications of Government Incentive on Biodiesel Prices 
In this section we argue that the major US biodiesel market driver is government 
intervention. Renewable fuel policies are essentially the factor behind the boom and bust 
experienced by the biodiesel market. Two policies have been the most influential in impacting 
market dynamics, the biodiesel tax credit and the renewable fuel volumetric mandate. In our 
analysis we follow the approach of Mallory, Hayes and Babcock (2011) to model the impact of a 
biofuel policy. With the same parsimonious method, we discuss the biodiesel tax credit and 
biodiesel-blending mandate. 
First, consider the supply and demand in the biodiesel market in Figure (11). We assume 
that some volume of biodiesel would still be produced even if government support was 
eliminated at point a with a free market quantity of Q* and price of P*. Due to the high cost of 
production of biodiesel its market price should be quite high; however, biodiesel and diesel are 
perfect substitutes. Thus, we denote the demand for biodiesel DULSD to illustrate the relationship 
between biodiesel and Ultra-Low Sulfur Diesel. We assume that consumers can entirely replace 
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biodiesel with diesel if diesel is cheaper. Thus, for biodiesel to achieve any sales, its selling price 
will have to equal the price of ULSD. 
Now, consider the effect of a $1/gallon tax credit. The biodiesel tax credit effectively 
allows blenders to bid a higher price and demand larger quantities beyond the market equilibrium 
quantity. To illustrate, Figure (12) represents the supply and demand for biodiesel under a tax 
credit. Blenders’ demand shifts outwards allowing them to reach a new equilibrium and demand 
quantity Q**. Because Q** exceeds Q*, biodiesel producers need to receive a price higher than 
P* in order to produce the higher quantity. However, at the new equilibrium, blenders, reflecting 
consumer demand for ULSD, will only pay price Pd. So, biodiesel producers will receive Ps, 
which would be the price at the new equilibrium point b and blenders will pay Pd at point c. The 
taxpayers finance this difference, presented by the rectangle bcPdPs.  
   Now consider the biodiesel market under a mandate. The mandate could be binding or 
non-binding. If the mandate is non-binding, the market equilibrium quantity without the 
influence of a policy is equal to or larger than the mandated amount. Then, this policy will have 
no impact on market dynamics in terms of price and quantity, as shown in Figure (13). In Figure 
(14) we observe the effect when a mandate is binding. Biodiesel producers must receive a price 
higher than the equilibrium to produce at the higher quantity Q
M
. At the new equilibrium 
blenders will have to pay the price at P
M
. However, they can only sell at the market price of 
diesel, since diesel is a perfect substitute to biodiesel. Blenders will buy biodiesel at P
M
 and sell 
it back in the market at the price presented by point a. The binding mandate creates a wedge 
between the required producer price and consumer price. This incidence will fall entirely on the 
blenders, presented by rectangle baPdP
M
.  
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  Since 2007 the US biodiesel market has been in periods where it was subject to both 
policies (Figure 15). When under such conditions, the tax credit will simply reduce the amount 
of the mandate incidence that falls on the blenders. Blenders will pay $1/gallon less to finance 
the mandate than they would without a tax credit. The tax credit will serve as a demand subsidy 
for blenders that will reduce the wedge between diesel and biodiesel prices and improve the 
blenders’ margins. To extend this concept, if the quantity under the mandate happens to be the 
same quantity that blenders would demand under a tax credit, Q
M
 and Q** are equal, then the 
incidence of the mandate would be completely offset by the tax credit.   
If a mandate is binding, this has a very significant implication. Revisiting Figure (11), 
when the market is performing without government intervention, biodiesel P* and Q* are 
determined simultaneously through shifts in the supply and demand curves. Once a binding 
mandate is in place the biodiesel price is solely determined by the intersection of the mandate 
level and the supply curve of biodiesel. The supply curve is a function of the cost of biodiesel 
production. Thus, changes in cost of production will result in shifting the supply curve and 
consequently changing the biodiesel price (Figure 16). Roughly 90% of cost of production is 
accounted for by biodiesel feedstock cost. As discussed earlier, in the United States, soybean oil 
makes up the highest percentage of all feedstock used. Thus, under a binding mandate we expect 
soybean oil prices to largely determine biodiesel prices.  
A few conditions must be identified for this causality relationship to hold. First, shifts in 
the supply must be bound by the fixed demand quantity Q
M
. That is, the cost of soybean oil 
cannot reach a point where it is low enough to create a large enough rightward shift in the supply 
curve to establish a new equilibrium quantity that is higher than Q
M 
(Figure 17). Similarly, 
demand shifters cannot create a large enough rightward shift to establish a new equilibrium 
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quantity that is higher than Q
M
. This is particularly important in the case of the presence of the 
tax credit (Figure 18). In other words, the tax credit could never be equal to or higher than the 
wedge created by the mandate for this causality relationship to continue to hold. Demand and 
supply should never intersect at a quantity Q* that is higher than Q
M 
. Should that occur, the 
mandate will no longer be binding and the market will operate again under competitive market 
equilibrium where causality cannot be identified.  
 The above summary of the impact of the two major policies in the biodiesel market 
creates a better framework from which we can begin to analyze the pricing relationships. In 
particular, the presence of a binding mandate allows us to identify the causality relationship 
between soybean oil prices and biodiesel. Without a binding mandate one would not be able to 
speak of the direction of causality between the two markets before consulting an empirical 
model. During the sample period of the Mallory, Irwin and Hayes (2012) study, the ethanol RFS 
mandate generally was not binding. Thus, the paper could not identify the causality between corn 
and ethanol prior to use of a time series model. In the biodiesel market, however, we would be 
able to make a strong argument for the direction of causality between soybean oil and biodiesel. 
Given we find evidence for a binding mandate; we would be surprised if the results of our 
econometric analysis identified the direction of the causality to be different than what we 
illustrated here.  
4.3 Data Description 
The dataset consists of weekly spot prices for Iowa soybean oil, Iowa biodiesel, Iowa 
natural gas, and national glycerin and methanol from the week ending in April 13, 2007 until the 
week ending in March 1, 2013
20
. Additional data includes weekly Chicago spot biodiesel prices 
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We use Iowa prices because we model our work of a biodiesel plant that is located in Iowa 
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and nearby heating oil futures prices from the same sample period and Ultra Low Sulfur Diesel 
spot prices from September 4, 2009 and until March 1, 2013
21
.  
The weekly series were generated by taking the observed prices on the Friday of every 
week. Crude Iowa soybean oil prices were obtained from the Iowa Soybean Processor Report
22
 
from the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service. The prices were in cents per pound but for the 
purpose of this paper were converted in $/lb. Iowa biodiesel prices were collected from the 
National Weekly Ag Energy Roundup from the USDA Agricultural Statistics Services. Iowa 
natural gas prices, provided by EIA
23
,  are monthly and in $/1000 cubic feet, converted later to 
weekly by assigning the monthly average as an observation for each week during a particular 
month. OPIS weekly reports provide spot prices for methanol at the US gulf coast in $/gallon, 
converted later to $/lb. by dividing by its density of 6.62, and crude glycerin prices at FOB 
Midwest in $/lb. Chicago Ultra Low Sulfur Diesel (ULSD) and biodiesel weekly spot prices 
were also collected from the OPIS reports
24
, and heating oil prices were collected from New 
York Mercantile Exchange.  
On some Fridays where the data was not provided, the nearest available price information 
was used. Methanol and glycerin prices were available only from May 8, 2009 until March 1, 
2013. However, the price of these two variables has not changed drastically over time thus the 
average of the available observations was used as the observations in the period from April 13, 
2007 until May, 1, 2009 for purposes of consistency. Due to biodiesel technology, methanol and 
glycerin do not make up a large portion of the cost. Nor will they be used in our later time series 
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Reports from ULSD prices were available only starting 2009. Heating oil futures are used as a proxy. Chicago 
prices were used because ULSD prices for Iowa were not available   
22 http://search.ams.usda.gov/mnsearch/mnsearch.aspx 
23 http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n3035ia3m.htm 
24 http://www.opisnet.com/ 
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analysis. Thus, we believed this method was sufficient for the purpose of our analysis. Chicago 
ULSD prices are available only since September 4, 2009. We did not think that using a similar 
methodology to complete the missing observation for Chicago ULSD is suitable. Thus, heating 
oil prices were used as proxy for the missing ULSD prices observation. For the period from 
September 4, 2009 until March 1, 2013, heating oil and ULSD prices are highly correlated (0.98) 
and have an average error of $0.01/gallon that is not significantly different from zero. Further, 
these variables will be used to illustrate the impact of policy in the market and will not be 
utilized for other purposes in the analysis.  
Table (1) shows some summary statistics of the different variables. It is important to note 
that these statistics are for the raw data. Most variables have very small variances except for 
biodiesel with a variance of 0.75. The statistics for Iowa and Chicago biodiesel prices are very 
close which indicates that despite the difference in location the Chicago biodiesel prices capture 
the important aspects of Iowa biodiesel prices. Table (2) shows the different correlation between 
the variables. Only soybean oil exhibits strong correlation with biodiesel. Other variables don’t 
exhibit strong correlation either with each other or with biodiesel. Chicago biodiesel prices and 
Iowa biodiesel prices have a correlation of 0.99.  
4.4 The Structural Model  
 This section describes our first approach to studying the linkage between biodiesel and 
soybean oil prices. To understand the relationships governing these markets we test for the 
simple zero-profit equilibrium market condition. We obtain the breakeven biodiesel prices and 
compare them with the spot prices for the biodiesel market. This approach utilizes the Iowa State 
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University Ag Marketing Decision Maker tool
25
, which traces the profitability of an Iowa 
biodiesel plant with 30-million gallon/year capacity constructed in 2007. 
 The Decision Maker tool considers a turnkey production facility that operates at full 
capacity and is 50% lender financed and 50% equity financed. The plant uses alkali-catalyst 
production technology with soybean oil as the only feedstock. We consider the plant as 
representative of all biodiesel plants in the US and thus results based on this model reflect the US 
biodiesel and soybean oil markets. The assumptions with most importance to our research are 
with regard to the conversion rates of inputs into one gallon of biodiesel. With a profit function 
of          , a nonprofit condition results in      . We customize this to the biodiesel 
plant and get the following: 
  (          )    
         
          
      
         
                    ( ) 
The right hand side is comprised of   
  which is the biodiesel price,   
    is the glycerin price, 
  
   soybean oil price,   
   is the natural gas, and   
    is the methanol multiplied by their 
conversion factors for one gallon of biodiesel along with       which is the variable cost 
excluding soybean oil cost and    which is the fixed cost. Shifting the variables around we 
obtain the biodiesel breakeven price for the non-profit condition,  
  
         
               
         
           
          ( ) 
Relatively close to the EIA estimated factors in Section 2.2, the model assumes that to make one 
gallon of biodiesel 7.55 pounds of soybean oil, seven cubic feet of natural gas and 0.71 pounds 
of methanol are needed. A byproduct from this process is 0.9 pounds of glycerin, whose revenue 
is accounted for as well. Variable costs includes the cost of the catalyst used and other operating 
                                                          
25 http://www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm/refirst.html 
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expenses such as electricity, water, transportation and maintenance cost and is estimated to be a 
total of $0.25/ gal of biodiesel. Fixed cost accounts for labor, interest, and taxes costs and is 
estimated to be $0.26/gal. Including the fixed cost in the breakeven equation ensures that the 
outcome is in long-run terms. 
 The equations lays out the components that go into the cost of making a gallon of biodiesel 
and the relative significance of each based on their coefficients. We expect soybean oil to 
account for the lion’s share of the cost of production and other costs to be marginal. The 
breakeven values we calculate are over all costs
26
. To analyze the non-profit long run 
equilibrium relationship, the estimated weekly breakeven biodiesel prices obtained from 
Equation 3 are compared to weekly spot Iowa biodiesel prices. If the non-profit relationship 
exists, then the breakeven and spot biodiesel price will be very close in value. The soybean oil-
biodiesel causality relationship can be confirmed by providing evidence for a binding mandate. If 
a binding mandate exists, then a wedge between biodiesel and diesel prices should exit.  Results 
from this approach are crosschecked against results from formal time series tests. 
4.5 Time Series Models  
This section discusses the formal statistical models that we use. Section 4.4.1 discusses the 
tests for nonstationarity and cointegration and the vector error correction model. Section 4.5.2 
discusses the methodology we use to test for structural break should we have a reason to suspect 
their presence.   
4.5.1 Testing for Cointegration  
 To crosscheck results from the structural model we follow statistical methods for testing 
for cointegration. We begin the process by testing for stationarity. The presence of a unit root 
                                                          
26 We also use this equation to estimate other measures of profitability such as net return per gallon that are useful to 
our analysis. 
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suggests that the data does not have a finite variance nor a long run mean, that is, the data is not 
stationary. The underlying assumptions of the classical OLS model necessitates that the data 
must be a stationary sequence where the errors have a mean of zero and a finite variance. When 
data is non-stationary the errors are permanent and increase with time and do not have a zero 
mean and exhibit a high degree of autocorrelation violating assumptions of the OLS model. It 
has been found that in fact non-stationary data applied to OLS models will generate significant 
results, a high F statistic and a high R
2
. Granger and Newbold (1974) referred to this observation 
as spurious regression where despite the high significance the results have no economic meaning.  
To determine the nature of the data sequence, we use the Augmented Dickey Fuller test. 
The Dickey Fuller test is based on OLS estimation of a number of equations with a sequence that 
contains a unit root. A t-statistic is estimated for the coefficient of that sequence and is tested 
against the null of not significantly different from zero. If the null is rejected, then a unit root 
exists and the data is non-stationary. We apply the Augmented Dickey Fuller test, which corrects 
for autocorrelation in the error terms and allows for the use of the more accurate Mackinnon 
approximate p-value. To conduct this test, and also later tests we must determine the appropriate 
lag length. For that purpose, we use the appropriate STATA to obtain the Schwarz Bayesian 
Information Criteria.  
After determining whether the data is non-stationary, we test for the presence of a co-
integration relationship using the Johansen Trace Test. The Johansen procedure uses a 
multivariate autoregressive approach to determine the number of cointegrating relationships 
among the variables being studied. It first test for the rank of cointegration of zero and then 
continues to increase the rank until the null of rank r is rejected. 
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If a cointegration relationship exists, we use the vector error correction model (VECM) 
procedure. This model has been used frequently in the literature to study the existence of a long 
run co-integrating relationship as it allows for two main characteristics of commodity prices, 
stochastic trends and co-movement over time. Assuming that the price linkages are of a linear 
nature, VECM estimates the long run relationship without the need to predetermine which 
variable is dependent and which variable is not. The results of the VECM are agnostic to any 
conceptual framework we predetermine. This model suits our need as it provides coefficients for 
the long run relationship. These values can be used to crosscheck the presence of the zero profit 
condition results from structural model. 
We estimate our vector error correction model that is in the form of: 
      
            
              (4) 
When applied to the biodiesel market with one cointegrating relationship we estimate two 
equations: 
       (                          )                                  (5) 
             (                          )                                  (6) 
where       are vectors representing the speed of adjustment back to the long run equilibrium. 
                                   are lagged terms that reflect the short run relationship and 
thus Granger Causalityand response of the one market to shocks in the other. The             
               term is the cointegration vector that should reflect the technical coefficients for 
producing one gallon of biodiesel if a non-profit condition exists. If this relationship holds then 
the cointegration vector will resemble[                         ]  [                  ] , which 
were obtained from the structural model. 
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4.5.2 Testing for Structural Breaks  
We present a method to test for structural breaks should we have evidence from our 
structural model that they exist. In order to formally estimate the number of structural breaks and 
to identify their location we follow the Kejriwal and Perron (2010) procedure that identifies 
multiple unknown structural breaks in a co-integrated regression. This is a sequential procedure 
that improves on other previous forms of structural break testing by using a Dynamic OLS 
model
27
. The model allows for stationary and non-stationary variables, leads and lags to be 
incorporated as regressors. It additionally allows changes in the intercept and the slope of the 
variables as best to minimize the sum of squared residuals. The model requires the identification 
of the direction of causality. We do not perceive this as a limitation because our conceptual 
analysis will allow us to infer that the direction of causality is from the soybean oil to the 
biodiesel market if we find the mandate to be binding.  
Kejriwal and Perron (2010) follow a number of steps to identify structural breaks. First, 
they estimate the sup-Wald, sup-Ft(K) for the null hypothesis of no structural breaks and an 
alternative hypothesis of K number of breaks. The maximum number of possible breaks is 
identified with the conventional rule that there needs to be at least 15% of the data within each 
subsample between the breaks. K in our case is identified to be 5. For each of the five breaks the 
sup-Ft(K) is estimated. Second, the maximum sup-Wald test statistic is obtained and a double 
maximum test is conducted with the null hypothesis of no breaks versus an unknown number of 
breaks. If UDmax statistic rejects the null, rejecting that there are no breaks in the dataset, a 
sequential procedure for break testing is conducted. In this third step, SEQ(k+1|k) takes place 
where the null states that there exits K breaks versus K+1 breaks. The test is done for 1,2,…,K 
                                                          
27 To deal with the problem of possibility of nonstationary endogenous regressor   
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breaks until the null is no longer rejected and the exact number of breaks is finally identified. 
Finally, the exact dates for the breaks are later identified using the Bai and Perron (1998, 2006) 
procedure. This procedure estimates the number of models with different break points given the 
number of breaks. It then chooses the model that fits the data best, having the maximum F 
statistic across all possible break dates. This last step essentially repeats the first step
28
.  
4.6 Summary  
This chapter presented the theory, data sets and both approaches we intend to utilize to 
understand the US biodiesel profitability and market linkages. The chapter explains why a long 
run non-profit relationship should hold in the biodiesel market. The theory of efficient markets 
states that, given free entry and exit, market participants will adjust the market prices to zero-
profit equilibrium. The large capacity of the US biodiesel permits this to occur, since much of 
which is idle. It also reviewed the impact of the mandate and the tax credit on the biodiesel 
market. With a binding mandate under specific conditions, we are able to identify the direction 
of causality between the biodiesel and soybean oil markets. The mandate creates a wedge 
between the blenders selling and buying prices. The tax credit on the other hand acts as demand 
subsidy and increases the amount the blenders can consume without changes in the prices. The 
incidence of the tax falls entirely on the taxpayers. Finally, when combined, the tax credit simply 
reduces the blenders’ incidence of the mandate by $1/gallon. 
The chapter illustrates that the first approach utilizes the theory of competitive markets and 
the profit function of an Iowa biodiesel plant to derive an identity for the biodiesel breakeven 
price in the long run. The second approach utilizes Augmented Dickey Fuller test, Johansen 
cointegration test and finally a vector error correction model and the Kejriwal and Perron test for 
                                                          
28 The use of this approach was possible through the contribution of George Lehecka, Ph.D. candidate at the 
University of Vienna.   
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structural breaks. Our methodology follows the Mallory, Irwin and Hayes (2012) study however, 
we contribute to it by using the Kejriwal and Perron test for structural breaks should they exist. 
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5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings from the approach followed above. Section 5.2 
presents the results from the structural model and briefly discusses them. The first approach sets 
the stage from which we begin to delve into time series analysis. Section 5.3 presents results 
from the cointegration tests and from the Kejriwal and Perron test. Section 5.4 discusses the 
results presented in the previous section. Section 5.5 summarizes. 
5.2  Structural Model Results  
We first examine the zero-profit relationship in the biodiesel market using the equations 
outlined in section 4.3. The errors between the Iowa spot price and the estimated breakeven price 
are computed. Figure (19) presents the results from the structural model. We observe that the 
estimated breakeven biodiesel and spot biodiesel prices are generally close in value over the 
sample period except for a period in 2011. It appears that the non-profit equilibrium relationship 
in fact existed in the market. The price that is bid in the market is close to what biodiesel 
producers would need to cover their total cost. For a firm to stay in operation in the long run, the 
market must offer a price that pays for its variable and fixed costs. However, during 2011 the 
market offered producers a price well above the minimum price that would cover their fixed and 
variable costs, and thus a departure from the nonprofit relationship occurred. The market appears 
to return to operating under a non-profit relationship starting in 2012, which suggests that the 
2011 observation was an unusual episode. We test for the zero-profit condition with the null that 
the average of the errors is not significantly different from zero. The average was $0.11 per 
gallon, and with a t-statistic of 6.5 we reject the null. Thus, we infer that, on average, the zero-
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profit relationship does not exist in the market in our sample period. However, when we examine 
the sample period excluding observations after March 4, 2011
29
, we find an average error of 
$0.02 and a t-statistic of 1.59, so we fail to reject that a zero profit relationship holds.    
To further investigate the anomalies in Figure (19), we plot the errors between the spot 
biodiesel and breakeven biodiesel price (Figure 20). We note that several departures are apparent 
using this approach. It seems that, in addition to the 2011 anomaly, a departure occurred in 2008 
that we were not able to discuss earlier because of its small magnitude relative to that of 2011. 
Figure (21) suggests there may be up to four breaks in the non-profit relationship in our sample.  
Through examining the graph closely we approximate the breaks to be March 7, 2008, January 
30, 2009, March 4, 2011 and February 3, 2012.  We find that with errors of -$0.01 and $0.01 and 
t-statistics of -0.27and 0.28 in Periods 1 and 5, we fail to reject the null of zero profit 
relationship. However, with average errors of 0.26, -0.07, and 0.60 and t-statistics of 9.9,-6.6, 
and 13.6 for Periods 2, 3 and 4, respectively, we reject the null of a zero profit relationship. Over 
all the non-profit condition holds or nearly holds in periods 1, 3, and 5 and clearly does not hold 
in periods 2 and 4.  
Although we cannot make absolute conclusions about the relationship from the structural 
model, we have a few theories that help us understand the breaks. First, 2008 was a year of rising 
oil prices and increased price volatility, in addition to being amidst the global economic crisis. It 
was also the first year that RFS2 mandate was instituted. All of these factors could have 
contributed to breaking the market equilibrium dynamics. Second, 2011 marked a year at the end 
of which the tax credit would have expired. We suspect that blenders recognized the tax credit 
                                                          
29 This date was obtained by closely examining the graph.  
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expiration and attempted to produce as much as possible to lock in that $1 per gallon credit. This 
behavior would particularly make sense under a binding blending mandate.  
The structural model results imply that soybean oil and biodiesel prices are tied together 
for much of the sample period under study. However, the structural model results are not 
sufficient to infer the direction of causality. As discussed earlier, with a binding mandate 
soybean oil prices will cause biodiesel prices under specified conditions. These include having a 
fixed quantity demanded at Q
M
 and rightward shifts in supply and demand that are bound by Q
M  
, as shown earlier in Figure (16). That is, if shifts occur they cannot be large enough to result in 
unbinding the mandate. To infer the existence of a binding mandate, we first investigate the 
presence of a difference between the blenders selling and buying prices, which are the ULSD 
prices
30
 and the biodiesel prices in our sample period. Figure (22) clearly shows biodiesel prices 
exceeding ULSD prices by a substantial amount throughout the sample period. This indicates 
that without government incentives, biodiesel would not be blended. To formally test for a 
binding mandate we must also take into account the impact of $1/gallon tax credit. In margin 
terms, the condition is,   
                                                                      ( ) 
We account in this condition for the $1/ gallon tax credit due to its ability to unbind the 
mandate as shown in Figure (17). Should the tax credit be large enough to unbind the mandate 
the blenders’ margins would be equal to or larger than zero. Figure (23) shows the results from 
testing the margin condition. The $1/gallon tax credit was accounted for in 2007- 2009, 2011, 
and 2013. Blenders’ gross margins are negative throughout the sample period, after accounting 
                                                          
30 ULSD missing prices before September 4, 2009 were estimated through the use of regression coefficients 
between ULSD and nearby heating oil futures prices from September 4, 2009 until March 1, 2013. 
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for the tax credit, with an average of $ -0.80/gallon. This indicates that the tax credit was never 
large enough to unbind the mandate. For the period prior to the enactment RFS2, we believe that 
the negative margins may be have been offset by the “splash and dash” practice31. This practice, 
however, was suspended by the end of 2008 and had no impact on margins thereafter. The results 
from the margin condition test after RFS2 was in effect, starting January 2009, are negative with 
an average of $ -0.96/gallon. This is evidence that the margin condition holds and that the 
mandate is binding. Thus, we conclude that US soybean oil prices should cause US biodiesel 
prices, which is consistent with our analysis in section 4.2.  
Finally, to examine the ability of our structural model to represent the US biodiesel 
profits, we conduct a sensitivity analysis for variation in the soybean oil conversion rate into 
biodiesel. The EIA provides an estimate of conversion rates of 7.3lb/gal while other research 
provides an estimate of 7.4 lb/gal. Figure (24) shows that our basic findings have not been 
influenced by using these alternative conversion rates. As the graph illustrates the structural 
breaks still occur in a similar manner with 2008 and 2011 appearing to be periods of departure 
from the non-profit relationship. Sensitivity analysis that investigates the use of different 
feedstocks would also be valuable in showing the ability of the structural model to represent the 
US biodiesel market. The structural model assumes that soybean oil is the only feedstock used in 
the market and thus we have no way of understanding how alternative feedstocks impact the 
biodiesel market profitability. A detailed discussion of the impact of different feedstock is 
beyond the scope of this research.   
                                                          
31 Exporting biodiesel blends to Europe allowed blenders to continue operating despite the negative domestic 
margins. 
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As the next step in the analysis, we move to formal statistical tests. The structural model 
results give us an indication of what we would expect to find from the cointegration model, but 
they are not conclusive. 
5.3 Formal Testing Model 
We begin our formal tests with conducting the VECM for the full sample. We determine 
the appropriate lag length to be one using Schwarz Bayesian Information Criteria test. We 
perform the Augmented Dickey Fuller test and fail to reject the null of a unit root. Both soybean 
oil and biodiesel prices are non-stationary in the full sample. Using the Johansen cointegration 
test (Table 3) we find a cointegrating relationship between soybean oil and biodiesel. Conducting 
the VECM, we pay attention to the speed of mean reversion parameters( ), linkages through the 
short-run pricing dynamics ( ) and the cointegration vector  . 
 The full sample results show that speed of mean reversion parameter is statistically 
significant only in the biodiesel equation (Table 4). This indicates that biodiesel price is the 
variable that adjusts for long run shocks, returning the system back to the long run equilibrium. 
Over the full sample, soybean oil is weakly exogenous. A shock in the form of a $0.10/gallon 
increase away from the long-run equilibrium will cause biodiesel price to decline by 
approximately $0.01/gallon. We find that the lag variables are only significant in the biodiesel 
equation. A $0.10/gallon increase in the previous biodiesel price will cause a $0.02/gallon 
decline in biodiesel price. A $0.10/lb. increase in the previous soybean oil  price will cause a 
$0.30/gallon increase in the biodiesel price. Thus, soybean oil influence biodiesel prices in the 
full sample through short-run pricing dynamics, as well. Finally, the   vector does not resemble 
our expectations for a non-profit relationship. The full sample   vector 
is [                        ]  [                 ], where the theoretical non-profit   vector 
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is[                        ]  [                 ]. The estimated constant is positive when we 
expect it to be negative. 
With the knowledge that a binding mandate exits, we find the   vector results to be 
contradictory with the conceptual framework. Thus, to gain a better picture of the cointegration 
relationship, we account for the presence of structural breaks as indicated by the structural 
approach. For this purpose we use the Kejriwal and Perron (2010) procedure. Presented in Table 
(5), we find that our dataset has four structural breaks. We further conduct the Bai and Perron 
test and identify March 14, 2008, January 23, 2009, March 4, 2011 and January 20, 2012 to be 
points of structural breaks in the cointegration relationship between biodiesel and soybean oil. 
This is a result that is remarkably close to what our structural model predicts. 
The structural model and the Kejriwal and Perron tests pose compelling evidence of 
change in the pricing relationship over five clear periods. Period 1 is from April 13, 2007 to 
March 14, 2008, Period 2 from March 21, 2008 to January 23, 2009, Period 3 from January 30, 
2009 to March 4, 2011, Period 4 from March 11, 2011 to January 20, 2012, and finally Period 5 
is from January 27, 2012 until March 1, 2013. Thus, in addition to our full sample analysis, we 
conduct the cointegration analysis for the five separate subsamples. For each period we 
determine the appropriate lag length using Schwarz Bayesian Information Criteria test. The lag 
length for all of the subsamples is one. We perform the Augmented Dickey Fuller test for all the 
subsamples which all fail to reject the null of a unit root. Both soybean oil and biodiesel prices 
are non-stationary in the subsamples. Performing the Johansen cointegration test (Table 3) we 
find that soybean oil and biodiesel are cointegrated in the first three subsamples. We do not find 
a cointegration relationship in the two subsamples after the structural break of March 4, 2011. 
Based on this result, we perform the vector error correction tests for periods 1 to 3.  
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  Period 1 results of the VECM indicate that the cointegration relationship is statistically 
significant in both the biodiesel and soybean oil equations. The   in both equations is 
statistically significant. However, both parameters have the same sign, which indicates that a 
nonprofit relationship does not hold
32
. The biodiesel lag variable for Period 1 is significant in 
both the biodiesel and soybean oil equation. Additionally, the soybean oil lag variable is 
significant in the biodiesel equation. It appears that the biodiesel and soybean oil markets 
respond to short run shocks in one another. Finally, Period 1   vector  estimates provide further 
evidence that it does not follow a non-profit relationship in the long run, as it is not consistent 
with the zero-profit relationship identified in section 4.3 (Table 5). 
For both Periods 2 and 3, only   that is associated with the biodiesel equation is 
statistically significant. Soybean oil in this case is weakly exogenous for both periods.  A 
disturbance of an increase of $0.10 /gallon profit in equilibrium relationship will cause the 
biodiesel price to decline by almost $0.05 a gallon and $0.03/gallon in Period 2 and Period 3 
respectively. We acknowledge that this response is large and we attribute that to the fact that if it 
wasn’t for government incentive biodiesel production may not be profitable at all. For both of 
these periods we find no influence of one market on the other through short run dynamics. 
However, Periods 2 and 3     vectors exhibit a striking resemblance to our structural model 
estimates of a long run relationship as explained earlier where the cointegrating vectors are 
[                         ]  [                  ]  and [                        ]  [              
    ] for Periods 2 and 3 respectively. For Periods 4 and 5, we cannot identify the relationship 
since there is no cointegration and application of the VECM is not suitable.  
                                                          
32
 If the estimated equilibrium relationship was governed by a non-profit relationship, the speed of mean reversion 
for both equations would have opposite signs, where positive profits will cause biodiesel price to fall and soybean 
oil price to rise sufficiently eliminating profit.  
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5.4 Discussion 
Our structural model results find that a number of structural breaks exist in the 
relationship between biodiesel and soybean oil prices. The structural model “eyeball” estimates 
for the dates on which the structural breaks occurred are strikingly close to the results from the 
Kejriwal and Perron (2010) procedure. Both models indicate that 2008 and 2011 were years of 
changing market dynamics. They both verify the departure from the long run equilibrium 
relationship in 2011. However, the structural model does not pick up the departure from the non-
profit relationship in Period 1 and exaggerates the difference between the Iowa biodiesel price 
and the estimated breakeven price in Period 2 and 3. It finally cannot inform us much about the 
relationship governing the market in Period 5. A formal statistical approach improves our 
understanding of the markets and makes up for limitations of the structural model. It recognizes 
Period 1 does not show a non-profit relationship and Period 5 does not experience any 
cointegration. It also recognizes that Periods 2 and 3, although experience a change in the 
cointegration relationship, do not depart from the non-profit condition. 
A number of factors can explain the episode observed by the structural model in 2008, 
since 2008 was a transitory period where the Global Financial Crisis occurred and commodity 
prices were very volatile. Additionally, 2008 was the first year where the RFS2 would have been 
instituted. Although RFS2 was not effective until the beginning of 2009, blenders’ knowledge of 
this imminent mandate changed their behavior. Period 1 is different from Period 2 and Period 3 
by the lack of a binding mandate
33
. Prior to the instatement of the mandate in December 2007 the 
market although governed by a cointegration relationship did not follow a non-profit 
relationship. The instatement of the mandate started taking effect on the market players’ behavior 
                                                          
33 It also is a period where the biodiesel industry was still in its early growth stages 
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early in 2008. The mandate caused the absolute causality between soybean oil and biodiesel and 
may have helped to enforce the non-profit condition.  
As for the structural break in 2011, we attribute it to the uncertainty surrounding the tax credit. 
While the RFS2 experienced no drastic policy changes since its legislation, the tax credit started 
to experience inconsistency in 2010. The credit was suspended at the end of 2009 and then 
reinstated in 2011 with uncertainty about whether it will be extended to 2012 or not. We suspect 
that blenders expected the credit not to be renewed at the end of 2011. Under a binding mandate, 
this information is a significant incentive for blenders to expand their operation. In an attempt to 
gain as much of the $1/gal credit as possible and to reduce the cost of the mandate in 2012, 
blenders pulled some of the mandated amount of 2012 to production in 2011. Since Renewable 
Identification Numbers (RINs) can be rolled over from one year to the other for up to two years, 
extra RINs that were used by blenders in 2011 were rolled over and used for compliance with 
2012 mandate. Thus, the total incidence of the mandate over the two years was likely 
unchanged34.
 
To estimate the amount of RINs that was produced over the two years, we subtract 
biodiesel exports from the sum of biodiesel production and imports
35
. The mandate in 2011 and 
2012 was 0.8 and 1 billion gallons respectively while the amount of RINs generated were 0.93 
and 0.88 billion gallons respectively. Since the sum of the RINs generated (1.81) for the two 
years almost exactly equals the mandate for the two years (1.8), it seems that blenders increased 
their effective mandate of 2011 and reduced that of 2012. Thus, a growing blender-driven 
demand bid the price of biodiesel above the breakeven value to induce the increase in output in 
2011. As a result, a departure from the long run non-profit equilibrium occurred.  
                                                          
34
 Refer to footnote 9.  
35
 RINs on exported biodiesel must be retired   
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Figure (19), taken from the structural model, indicates that the profit per gallon should be 
essentially zero during the periods before and after the nine months in 2011. Indeed, we find that 
$0.02/gallon and $0.03/gallon of profit is made from April 13, 2007 until that last week of March 
2011 and from the last week of December 2011 until the last week of February 2013. During the 
2011 anomaly, producers made an average of $ 0.67/gallon in profit. It is important to note that 
the profit within these months was never over $1.00 /gallon, except for a few weeks in 
September and October 2011. This indicates that biodiesel blenders bid the price above their tax 
credit only briefly and corrected it shortly.  
The collapse of the cointegration relationship in the periods after the third structural 
break is likely due to the response of market players to the uncertainty surrounding the federal 
tax credit. Periods 4 and 5 are different from the rest as they were characterized by the sporadic 
expiry and reinstatement of the tax credit. In 2011 an element of uncertainty enters the market. 
Having a large impact on the blenders’ margins, particularly under a binding mandate, 
uncertainty surrounding tax credit caused the market relationship to crumble and the co-
integrating relationship to breakdown. 
 The results from the full sample are not entirely misleading. They are in fact in line with 
the t-test for the non-profit relationship over the entire sample period in the structural model. 
However, we observe that there are periods in the dataset where the relationship meets our 
expectations. Periods 2 and 3 provide evidence for our hypothesis of a long run non-profit 
equilibrium relationship. Periods 4 and 5 have no cointegration at all. These are aspects that a 
cointegration test of the entire sample cannot capture.    
Additionally, our results are not far from the previous literature on the biodiesel market in 
section 3.3. Shultz (2012), Hassouneh et al. (2012), and Busse et al. (2012) find that a 
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cointegrating relationship exists between biodiesel and its feedstocks, where biodiesel prices 
respond to long run shocks. None of these studies, however, investigates these results in light of 
a binding mandate. Shultz (2012) attributes the results to biodiesel being traded domestically, 
while its feedstock is traded on the world market. Hassouneh et al. (2012) attribute their results 
to the Spanish biodiesel market being small and in an infant stage. Busse et al. (2012) attribute 
only the short run effects to changes in policy, both the blending mandate and the tax credit, and 
find that policy influences are not observed in the long run. 
Finally, although we follow the Mallory, Irwin and Hayes (2012) approach to 
investigating market linkages, we use spot prices throughout our analysis instead of nearby 
futures and one year to maturity futures. Mallory Irwin and Hayes (2012) apply their empirical 
approaches to nearby prices and one year to maturity prices to capture the dimension of 
equilibrium in the long run. As they hypothesized, they find that the long run equilibrium 
relationship in the ethanol market is evident only in the one year to maturity prices. However, in 
our research we find that the biodiesel spot market analysis is sufficient to detect a long run 
equilibrium relationship.  
5.5  Summary  
This chapter provided analysis of the results from the structural model and the time series 
model. It first provides the results from the structural model, then delves into the time series 
model and finally discusses the results.  
From the structural model, we deduce that the long run non-profit relationship did not 
exits over the entire sample period, particularly in a period in 2008 and another period in 2011. 
The structural model indicates that our data has four structural breaks in the non-profit 
relationship. In an attempt to better understand this, we test for the presence of a binding 
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mandate. We find that the mandate was binding throughout. This enables us to determine the 
direction of causality from the soybean oil market to the biodiesel market.  
Results from our time series analysis also suggest the presence of four structural breaks in 
the co-integration relationship at March 14, 2008, January 23, 2009, March 4, 2011 and January 
20, 2012, strikingly similar to the breaks we identified from the first approach. The cointegration 
analysis finds that a cointegration relationship exists in the full sample and the first three periods. 
The market structure breaks down however after the break in March 4, 2011. The non-profit 
relationship holds only from March 14, 2008 until March 4, 2011. In the full sample and in 
Period 1, the non-profit relationship does not hold.  
We suspect that the breaks are caused by the response of the market players to 
government policies. Prior to 2008, the RFS2 mandate was not in place, the biodiesel was still 
growing, and market forces are quite volatile. Only after market players accounted for the 
mandate, the direction of causality and the error vector meet our expectations. This caused the 
expected direction of causality, from soybean oil to biodiesel, and the non-profit relationship to 
hold in the market. The impact of the tax credit is not experienced until 2011 where the element 
of uncertainty about whether the tax credit will be in place or not is introduced. This uncertainty 
causes the cointegration relationship to breakdown.     
These two approaches used in addition to the conceptual framework presented give a 
comprehensive review of the linkages between the biodiesel and soybean oil market in the US. 
Essentially, our hypothesis about the market relationship does hold in most of the sample. It is 
quite interesting that the results from a defined structural model and a time series model that is 
agnostic to the conceptual theory are this close.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Summary and Review 
This thesis investigated the linkages between the biodiesel and the soybean oil pricing 
dynamics from April 13, 2007 to March 1, 2013. A plethora of research finds linkages between 
biofuels and agricultural markets. Many find that a long run equilibrium relationship ties these 
markets together along with linkages in the short run dynamics. This research investigated if 
such relationship existed in the US biodiesel market. This study comes at a time where biodiesel 
is becoming more important and relevant as it expanded and was further promoted by 
government incentives. 
The US biodiesel industry is unique in a number of aspects. Despite being 
technologically fit for use of multiple feedstocks, the majority of plants use soybean oil. 
Distributed around the country, with a concentration on the Midwest, these plants have plenty of 
idle capacity. Finally, biodiesel is used in the US predominantly in blends due to its chemicals 
characteristics. The biodiesel industry has been subject to a number of policies most important of 
which are the 2004 blenders’ Federal Tax Credit and the 2007 Second Renewable Fuel Standard 
blending mandate. Among other policies, these two contributed substantially to the rise and ebb 
of the biodiesel industry in the US. These characteristics allow us to utilize the theory of efficient 
markets and the impact of a binding mandate to answer our question about the pricing linkages.   
Literature that discusses the US biodiesel industry focused on the economic feasibility of 
producing it rather than its linkages with other markets. However, that literature provides us with 
evidence that conversion rates we use in our structural model have not changed over time. There 
is some literature that studies the biodiesel industry linkages with its feedstock; however it is 
recent and geographically restricted to the European Union. Yet, the literature gives us a feel of 
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what to expect our results to be. Most of the literature suggest that biofuel feedstock prices are 
weakly exogenous in the long run, that is, the direction of causality in the long run is from the 
agricultural to the biofuel markets. 
Based on Mallory, Irwin and Hayes (2012) we tackle the questions from two angles. First 
we use the zero-profit function of Iowa biodiesel plant from the Ag Decision Maker Tool of the 
Iowa State University to investigate conceptually the presence of a non-profit relationship in the 
long run. After establishing the conceptual link, we use time series analysis including the 
Kejriwal and Perron procedure, the Augmented Dickey Fuller test, Johansen Trace test and the 
vector error correction model to crosscheck our results. The only modification we make to the 
Mallory, Irwin and Hayes (2012) method is the use of a formal test for structural breaks in the 
cointegration relationship. 
The results for the structural and the time series testing are strikingly close. Both find that 
a long- run equilibrium relationship existed in the market but was disturbed by four breaks. The 
dates for the four structural breaks estimated by both methods are very close on March 14, 2008, 
January 23, 2009, March 4, 2011 and January 20, 2012. The results highlight the impact of 
government policies. Only after the binding mandate is introduced does the non-profit long run 
equilibrium relationship hold, with the expected direction of causality from soybean oil to 
biodiesel. Further, uncertainties regarding the Federal tax credit break the market structure after 
March 4, 2011. Finally, our results are not very far from what available literature suggest about 
the biodiesel market. Government interventions have a large influence on the market pricing 
dynamics for biodiesel. This is reflected in the enforcement of the mandate and the uncertainty of 
the tax credit in making or breaking the market structure. This large dependence of the market on 
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government incentive raises the question of whether biodiesel would be at all produced if it was 
left for the free market. 
6.2 Limitations and Future Work 
This research has certain limitations. First, it does not incorporate the response of the 
market to the antidumping and countervailing laws issued in 2008 by the European Union on the 
change of the cointegration relationship before the instatement of the mandate. For that purpose, 
a larger data set that goes back farther in time might generate better results. Second, it leaves out 
the study of the market dynamics when no cointegration relationship exists in Periods 4 and 5. 
This could be due to the impact of increased production from alternative feedstocks  on the 
market relationship and the breakdown of the biodiesel – soybean oil cointegration after March 
4, 2011. Further, this research paper can be enhanced if the Renewable Identification Numbers 
(RINs) were further analyzed in testing for the binding mandate. Also, a more rigorous 
investigation of the causes for the presence of negative blender’s gross margins before the 
enactment of RFS2 would provide a better understanding of the market. The research also 
utilizes spot market data and leaves out the use of the theory of storage and one year forward 
prices where the dimension of the long run equilibrium is truly captured.    
In terms of the interpretation of the results, it is important to note that conclusions based 
on this research are limited to assumptions made in the structural model that are specific to an 
Iowa biodiesel plant and Iowa prices. While this zero-profit relationship might be representative 
of US biodiesel to an extent, the true zero-profit relationship for the biodiesel market is 
determined by the cost of the other feedstocks used. The true relationship can also be influenced 
by the spatial variation in the feedstock price and fixed and variable costs. These are expected 
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limitations to representing an entire market with one model. Thus we acknowledge that this is a 
simplification of the true market.  
Moreover, although our discussion of the results is reasonable, some aspects of the 
market dynamics were left out. Blenders’ behavior may be influenced by the retroactive tax 
reinstatement. Blenders’ response to the expiration of the tax credit may have been mitigated by 
the common knowledge that the tax will be reinstated retroactively. That is, blenders may not 
have changed their level of operation despite the change in policy in anticipation of being 
reimbursed for the tax credit. Additionally, while the direction of causality in the long run must 
be from soybean oil to biodiesel with a binding mandate, the causality relationship is less defined 
as the mandate is being imposed. That is, the market reaction in the short run after a mandate 
level has been announced may reverse the causality.  For the reasons outlined above, we 
acknowledge that our research has its limitation and that there is plenty of room for the literature 
on the biodiesel industry to grow.   
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TABLES 
Variable Count Mean Variance Range 
April 13, 2007-March 1, 2013       Minimum Maximum 
Iowa Biodiesel 304 4.044 0.785 2.525 5.850 
Iowa Soybean Oil 304 0.442 0.010 0.263 0.656 
Natural Gas 304 0.007 0.000 0.003 0.012 
Chicago Biodiesel  308 3.97 0.858 2.43 5.88 
NYMEX Heating Oil Nearby  
Futures 
308 2.51 0.392 1.16 4.07 
September 4, 2009 – March 1, 2013 
Chicago ULSD 183 2.662 0.225 1.726 3.402 
May 8, 2009- March 1, 2013       Minimum Maximum 
Glycerin 200 0.080 0.001 0.045 0.150 
Methanol 200 0.155 0.001 0.075 0.204 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics for all the variables 
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 Correlation 
Coefficients 
Biodiesel  Soybean Oil Natural Gas Glycerin Methanol 
Biodiesel  1.00 0.94 0.11 0.19 0.55 
Soybean Oil 
 
1.00 0.09 0.33 0.52 
Natural Gas 
  
1.00 0.11 -0.06 
Glycerin 
   
1.00 0.41 
Methanol         1.00 
 
Table 2: Correlation Coefficients among the Variables 
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Notes: * Indicates significance at the 5% level.** Indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 3: Johansen Cointegration Test for Biodiesel and Soybean oil  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Trace test 5% c.v 1% c.v 
Full 
sample 
April 13, 2007 – March 1, 2013 r<0    56.1116 15.41 20.04 
  r<1 4.7850** 3.76 6.65 
Period 1 April 13, 2007 - March 14, 2008  r<0  29.8553 15.41 20.04 
    r<1 3.2242** 3.76 6.65 
Period 2 March 21, 2008 - January 23, 2009 r<0  26.7912 15.41 20.04 
    r<1 0.1181** 3.76 6.65 
Period 3 January 30, 2009 - March 4, 2011 
 
33.9297 15.41 20.04 
      0.020449** 3.76 6.65 
Period 4 March 11, 2011  - January 20, 2012 r<0  19.755** 15.41 20.04 
    r<1 3.22* 3.76 6.65 
Period 5 January 27, 2012- March 1, 2013  r<0  9.9283** 15.41 20.04 
    r<1 1.77 3.76 6.65 
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Constant Soybean oil  
 
 
Theoretical 
 Breakeven   
-0.67 -7.55   
 
Estimated 
  
Period 1 2.161113 -15.8617 
 
 
 
Period 2 -0.5979526 -7.960433 
 
 
 
Period 3 -0.6509107 -7.324985 
 
 
 
Full 
Sample 
0.2195076 -9.736967   
  
Full sample Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
 
Variable Estimated Coefficients  
Biodiesel    
-.0965781** 
(.022323) 
-0.1888078 ** 
(.0376781) 
-.4937335  ** 
(.1545018) 
-.323037** 
 (.3230376 ) 
 
Biodiesel 
Lag 
-.2163914** 
(.0599129) 
-0.590744** 
(.1429722) 
-.2362003 
 (.1523417) 
-0.1706356 
(.1052302) 
 
Soybean 
oil Lag 
2.786508** 
(.4289292) 
3.098101** 
(.7070433) 
1.245984 
 (1.252221) 
1.602332 
 ( .9044662) 
 
Constant 
1.42e-06 
(.0065776) 
-.0007628 
(.0151829) 
0.0000168  
( .0258361) 
-6.59e-06  
 ( .0103355) 
Soybean 
oil 
   
.0002376 
(.0037152) 
-0.028395 ** 
(.0081606) 
-0.0019901  
(.0306661) 
-.0010219  
 (.0137033) 
 
Biodiesel 
Lag 
-.0024413 
(.0099714) 
-0.1461614 ** 
(.0309658) 
0.0075569 
(.0302374  ) 
0.0148388 
 (.0152693) 
 
Soybean 
oil Lag 
.0627455 
(.0713873) 
0.0178324 
(.1531359) 
.0473454  
(.248546) 
-.0284943 
 (.1312414) 
 
Constant 
.0005778 
(.0010947) 
0.0050723 
(.0032884) 
-.0041652 
 (.005128) 
.0020826 
(0.0014997) 
 
Notes: * Indicates significance at the 5% level.** Indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
Table 4: Error Correction Results and Granger Causality 
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Tests Test Statistic 
SupFT(1) 43.809** 
SupFT(2) 98.804** 
SupFT(3) 126.3531** 
SupFT(4) 134.462** 
SupFT(5) 109.052** 
UD max 134.462** 
SupFT(2|1) 134.457** 
SupFT(3|2) 109.8999** 
SupFT(4|3) 70.749** 
SupFT(5|4) 3.913 
Dates and confidence intervals 
 
 
 
March 14, 2008 
(February 8, 2008 - April 4, 2008) 
 
 
 
January 23, 2009 
(January 9, 2009 - February 6, 2009) 
 
 
 
March 4, 2011 
 (February 18, 2011 -March 11, 2011) 
 
 
January 20, 2012 
(January 13, 2012- February 10 2012) 
 
 Table 5: Kejriwal and Perron (2010) Test of Multiple Structural Breaks  
 
 
 
 
 
  ̂ 
  ̂ 
  ̂ 
  ̂ 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Process Diagram of Soybean Crush and Biodiesel Conversion  
Source: Padhan et al.2011 
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Figure 2: Feedstock Used for Biodiesel Production Percentages, 2010 -2012 
Source: US Energy Information Administration 
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Figure 3: US Biodiesel Plants by Capacity in Mil of Gallons end of 2012  
Source: Biodiesel Magazine Plant List  
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Figure 4: Biodiesel Plant Size Distribution in the United States by the End of 
2012 
Source: Biodiesel Magazine Plant List  
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Figure 5: Percentage Plant Distribution by Feedstock Type Technology in the 
US, May 2013 
 
Source: Biodiesel Magazine Plant List  
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Figure 6: US Biodiesel Policies Timeline from 2001-2012 
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Figure 7: Renewable Fuel Standard Proposed Volumes by Year 
Source: US Energy Information Administration 
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Figure 8: Mandate Biodiesel Volume in Bil of Gallons 
Source: EPA 
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Figure 9: B100 US Consumption and Production in Mil Gallons, 2001 -2011 
Source: US Energy Information Administration 
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Figure 10: B100 US Exports and Imports in Mil Gallons, 2001-2011 
Source: US Energy Information Administration 
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Figure 11: The Biodiesel Market in Equilibrium  
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Figure 12: The Biodiesel Market under the Impact of a Tax Credit 
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Figure 13: The Biodiesel Market with a Non-binding Mandate 
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Figure 14: The Biodiesel Market with a Binding Mandate 
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Figure 15: The Biodiesel Market under the Impact of a Binding Mandate and a Tax Credit 
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Figure 16: Biodiesel Pricing under a Binding Mandate  
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Figure 17: Biodiesel Pricing with a Large Enough Rightward Shift in Supply that Unbinds 
the Mandate  
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Figure 18: The Biodiesel Market under the Impact of a Binding Mandate and a Tax Credit 
that is Large Enough to Unbind the Mandate 
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Figure 19: Weekly Spot Biodiesel and Breakeven Value Over all Costs at Iowa Biodiesel 
Plant, April 13, 2007 - March 1, 2013 
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Figure 20: Iowa Biodiesel Price and Estimated Breakeven Price Errors, April 13, 2007 -
March 1, 2013 
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Figure 21: Iowa Biodiesel Price and Estimated Breakeven Price Errors with Approximated 
Structural Breaks, April 13, 2007- March 1, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 $(0.60)
 $(0.40)
 $(0.20)
 $-
 $0.20
 $0.40
 $0.60
 $0.80
 $1.00
 $1.20
 $1.40
4/13/2007 4/13/2008 4/13/2009 4/13/2010 4/13/2011 4/13/2012
E
rr
o
rs
 (
$
/g
a
l)
 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 
 82 
 
 
Figure 22: Chicago Biodiesel and Diesel Spot Prices, April 13, 2007 - March 1, 2013 
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Figure 23: Biodiesel Blenders Gross Margins, April 13, 2007-March 1, 2013 
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Figure 24: Iowa Biodiesel Price and Estimated Breakeven Price Errors with Difference 
Soybean Oil Conversion Rates, April 13, 2007 - March 1, 2013 
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